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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTPEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991)
I.

INTRODUCTION

BaLon v. Kentucky subjected a prosecutor's peremptory jury
challenges to the restrictions of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.' In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co, the Court for the
first time extended Batson to private litigants in civil trials. 2 In order
to make this extension, the Court in Edmonson found that a private
litigant exercising a peremptory challenge involves sufficient state
action to subject such a challenge to constitutional restrictions.
This Note finds that the Court correctly selected the test established
in Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co. 3 to determine the existence of state action in a private peremptory jury challenge. Although the Court
correctly found state action, this Note also reasons that this result is
not as obvious as the Court suggests. In the final analysis, the statutory foundation of peremptory challenges, the involvement of the
trial judge in the exercise of peremptory challenges, and the effects
of discriminatory challenges on the parties, jurors and community
together prove that a peremptory challenge exercised by a private
litigant in a civil trial constitutes state action. For this reason, the
Supreme Court appropriately extended Batson to civil trials. Finally,
this Note explores the negative consequences articulated by Justice
Scalia in his dissent and finds that Justice Scalia oversimplified and
probably overstated the potential hazards of the Edmonson decision.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court historically has invoked the Equal Protection Clause injury selection proceedings. The Court first addressed
the issue of racial discrimination injury selection over one hundred
years ago in Strauder v. West Virginia.4 In Strauder, a black male acI Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2 Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2078 (1991).
3 457 U.S. 163 (1982).
4 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
1000
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cused of murder was to be tried before a jury.5 Since at that time
West Virginia law mandated that all juries consist entirely of white
males, the trial court summoned an all white venire for jury selection.6 Strauder objected to the racial composition of the venire,
claiming that he was being denied the right possessed by white
7
males to be tried before a jury consisting of his racial peers.
Reversing a West Virginia Supreme Court decision denying
Strauder's claim, the United States Supreme Court held that a black
defendant denied the right to a jury consisting of his racial peers is
denied the equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.8 The
Court reasoned that white males in West Virginia derived inherent
benefits from a jury composed entirely of white individuals. 9 A
black defendant denied the right to a jury composed of black individuals is denied these inherent benefits solely on account of his
race. 10
Almost ninety years later in Swain v. Alabama, the Court again
addressed the subject of racial discrimination in jury selection."
The prosecutor in Swain used peremptory challenges to strike the
only six black individuals on the jury venire.12 The defendant, a
black male, charged that the prosecutor's actions in securing an allwhite jury denied the defendant equal protection of the laws.' 3 The
trial court denied the defendant's motions, and on appeal the Ala4
bama Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.'
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
state courts, although in a qualified manner. 15 After dismissing
Swain's claims concerning the selection of grand jurors and the petit
jury venire, the Court denied Swain's claim that the state's use of
peremptory challenges violated the Equal Protection Clause.' 6 In
so doing, the Court focused on the nature of the peremptory challenge and stated "that it is one exercised without a reason stated,
17
without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control."'
5 Id. at 304.
6 Id
7 Id.
8 Id. at 310.
9 Id. at 309.
10 Id.
11 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
12 Id. at 210.
13 Id. at 203-204. Defendant Swain was indicted and convicted of rape in the Circuit
Court of Tallageda County, Alabama, and sentenced to death.
14 Id. at 203.
15 Id. at 224.
16 Id. at 209.
17 Id. at 220.
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The Court concluded that imposing a requirement for the trial court
to examine peremptory challenges at the request of a defendant
would defeat the purpose of peremptory challenges. 1 8 The Court
created a strong presumption that the prosecutor uses the state's
peremptory challenges in an effort to select a fair and impartial
9
jury.'
While deciding that the defendant cannot challenge the removal of black individuals from a particularjury, the Court questioned the presumption in favor of the prosecutor when a state
removes all black individuals from juries over a significant period of
time. 20 Upon proof of such a pattern, the Court may infer that the
state is denying black individuals the right to jury participation and
2
therefore denying blacks equal protection under the law. '

Thus, to successfully challenge the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges under Swain, a defendant had to prove consistent
and systematic discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the
state. This standard placed a great burden on defendants; indeed,
the Court in Swain held that the defendant failed to overcome this
heavy burden of proof.2 2 In the two decades following this decision,

the large burden of proof faced by defendants insulated prosecu2
tors' peremptory challenges from constitutional review. 3
Twenty years later, the Supreme Court removed the obstacles
presented by this severe burden of proof in Batson v. Kentucky. 24 The
Court stated that by requiring proof of a series of discriminatory
acts to redress a constitutional violation, a denial of equal protection
of the laws to a single defendant would go unchallenged. 25 The
Court noted that previous decisions permitted the establishment of
18 Id. at 222. The Court stated that the "essential nature" of the peremptory chal-

lenge is that no reason is necessary for its use. The Court reasoned that the nature of
this challenge has traditionally played an essential role in the creation of an impartial
jury. Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 224.
21 Id. The Court stated,
Such proof might support a reasonable inference that Negroes are excluded from
juries for reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on trial and
that the peremptory challenge system is being used to deny the Negro the same
right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice as the white
population. These ends the peremptory challenge is not designed to facilitate or
justify.
Id.
22 Id.

23 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (explaining that lower courts had observed that defendants would find it difficult to undertake the investigation efforts necessary to meet the burden of proof).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 95.
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a prima facie case of discrimination from evidence surrounding the
venire selection in a single case and held that the same standards of
26
proof should apply to peremptory challenges.
Batson thus established that if a defendant could make a prima
facie case that a prosecutor's peremptory challenge was motivated
by racial discrimination, the prosecutor would be required to offer a
race-neutral explanation for the state's peremptory challenge. 2 7
Such an explanation must consist of more than an assertion that the
challenged juror would be partial to the defendant because of the
juror's race. 28 Upon offering of the race-neutral explanation, the
trial court must decide if the defendant has established that the
29
prosecutor has engaged in purposeful discrimination.
The Court defended its relaxation of the Swain proof standard
in two ways. 30 First, the Court asserted that in reality peremptory
challenges too often are exercised to remove black individuals from
juries.3 1 Second, the Court rebutted the state's argument that a
lower burden of proof would result in serious administrative burdens on the courts by noting that state courts already using the evidentiary standard set forth in this decision had not experienced
32
significant administrative problems as a result.
Thus, after Batson a criminal defendant can challenge a prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge under the Equal Protection
Clause. If the defendant can make a prima facie case that the prosecutor exercised the challenge in a racially discriminatory manner,
the court must require that the prosecutor offer a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge. The Court decided Batson
26 Id. at 96. See Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (finding a prima facie case
of racial discrimination in grand jury selection from statistical disparities and discriminatory selection methods); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972) (finding a prima
facie case of racial discrimination in grand jury selection from selection procedures and
the pool of potential jurors).
27 Batson, 479 U.S. at 96. The Court said that to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group
and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove members of the
defendant's race from the jury. The defendant then must show that these facts and any
other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor's motives in exercising the peremptory challenge were discriminatory. Id.
28 Id. at 97. The Court stated, "The core guarantee of Equal Protection, ensuring
citizens that their state will not discriminate on account of race, would be meaningless
were we to approve the exclusion ofjurors on the basis of such assumptions, which arise
solely from the juror's race." Id.
29 Id. at 98.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 99.
32 Id. The Court provided little support for this assertion, citing one California case
in which the court could find no evidence of administrative difficulties. Id. (citing People
v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 672 P.2d 854 (1983)).
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in the context of a criminal trial and did not comment on application
of the holding to peremptory jury challenges in a civil trial. The
Court addressed this issue in Edmonson.
III.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Thaddeus Donald Edmonson, a black male construction
worker, was injured while on the job at Fort Polk, Louisiana, a federal enclave. 3 3 Edmonson sued Leesville Concrete Company in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana
and asserted that a Leesville employee caused a truck to roll backward and pin Edmonson against construction equipment, causing
Edmonson's injury. 3 4 Edmonson requested a trial by jury. 3 5
As authorized by federal statute, during voir dire Leesville used
two of its three peremptory challenges to remove black persons
from the prospective jury. 3 6 Edmonson asked the District Court to
require Leesville to offer a race-neutral reason for its challenges,
37
pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky.
The District Court denied Edmonson's request, stating that Batson
does not apply to'civil proceedings. 38 Completion of the jury selection process resulted in a jury of eleven white individuals and one
black individual. 3 9
After the trial proceedings, the jury rendered a verdict for Edmonson and assessed his total damages at $90,000.40

The jury,

however, found that Edmonson's contributory negligence accounted for eighty percent of the fault and awarded him a total of
only $18,000.

41

Edmonson appealed the case on the grounds that Batson required Leesville to offer a race-neutral explanation for its peremptory challenges. 4 2 Reversing the District Court, a divided panel of
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Batson indeed
applies to a private attorney representing a private party, and that
peremptory challenges may not be used in a civil trial for exclusions
based solely on the prospective juror's race. 43 The Court of Ap33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2080 (1991).
Id. at 2080.
Id. at 2081.
Id.
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Edmondson, 11 S. Ct. at 208 1.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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peals remanded the case to the trial court to consider whether Edmonson had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination
44
pursuant to Batson.
The full court of the Fifth Circuit ordered a hearing en banc,
and a divided panel affirmed the District Court's holding that a private attorney in a civil case need not present race-neutral explanations for peremptory jury challenges. 4 5 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide the issue of whether Batson applies to
46
civil trials.
IV.

A.

SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

THE MAJORITY OPINION

Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.4 7 He began the opinion by stating that the Constitution's protections of individual liberty and equal protection generally apply only to
governmental actions. 48 Although always invidious, racial discrimi49
nation only violates the Constitution if attributed to state action.
Therefore, the Court addressed to what extent a private litigant exercising a peremptory challenge in a civil case constitutes state action subject to constitutional restrictions. 50
The Court recognized that courts must often consider where to
draw the line between governmental and private conduct. 5 1 While
the actions of private parties ordinarily rest beyond the reach of the
Constitution, governmental authority sometimes permeates an activity to such a large extent that the the private parties involved are
subject to constitutional restraints. 52 In Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co.,
the Court considered the state action question in the context of a
due process challenge to a state's procedure allowing private parties
to obtain pre-judgment attachments. 53 Under Lugar, constitutional
restrictions apply to rights deprivations which (1) result from the
44

Id.

45

Id.

46
47

Id.

Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and Souter joined in the majority
opinion. Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia joined. Justice Scalia also filed a separate dissenting opinion.
48 Edmondson, 111 S. Ct. at 2082.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holding that issuance

of liquor license by state to private fraternal organization does not implicate state in
discriminatory guest policies of fraternal organization).
52 Edmondson, 111 S. Ct. at 2082.
53 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
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exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority,
54
and (2) are charged to a state actor.
The Court stated that private litigants' peremptory challenges
obviously fulfill the first Lugar requirement because peremptory
challenges are intended to permit the litigants to assist the government in ensuring the impartiality of the jury and are derived from
statute or decisional law. 5 5 Without the authorization of an Act of
Congress, Leesville would not have been able to engage in the dis56
criminatory peremptory challenges.
The Court analyzed three factors in applying the second requirement for a constitutionally prohibited deprivation under
Lugar.5 7 The Court first assessed the extent to which the private
actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits and concluded
that the peremptory challenge system could not exist without the
significant participation of the government.5" The government summons jurors, restricts their freedom of movement during trials and
subjects them to public scrutiny. 5 9 In addition, the judge places the
authority of the court behind a peremptory challenge by dismissing
60
the stricken juror.
Second, to determine whether Leesville was a state actor, the
Court assessed the extent to which the action in question involves
the performance of a traditional function of the government. 6 1 The
Court noted that a peremptory challenge is used in selecting a jury
that exercises the power of the court and of the government granting the court's jurisdiction. 62 A civil jury in federal court is generally responsible for factual determinations, and a decision
63
enforceable by the court will incorporate the judgment of the jury.
54 Id. at 937. In Lugar, the Court held that a private party obtaining a pre-judgment
attachment pursuant to a procedure created by the state constituted state action. Id.
55 Edmondson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083.
56 Id. The Court stated that exercise of a peremptory challenge is not a constitutional right, it is solely a creature of statute. Id. "In civil cases, each party shall be
entitled to three peremptory challenges." 28 U.S.C. 1970 (1988).
57 Edmondson, Il1 S. Ct. at 2083.
58 Id. at 2084. "It cannot be disputed that, without the overt, significant participation
of the government, the peremptory challenge system, as well as the jury trial system of
which it is a part, simply could not exist." Id.
59 Id. The Court noted that these jury procedures were established by statute. Id.
(citing 28 U.S.C. 1970).
60 Id. The Court also stated that because the trial judge oversees the exclusion of
jurors for cause, the judge determines which jurors remain subject to peremptory challenges. Id.
61 Id. at 2085.
62 Id. "The peremptory challenge is used in selecting an entity that is a quintessential governmental body, having no attributes of a private actor." Id.
63 Id.

PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

1992]

1007

The Court asserted that when the objective of a proceeding is to
determine representation on a governmental body,6 that proceeding constitutes state action. 6 5 For these reasons, the Court concluded that the selection of jurors with the aid of peremptory
challenges is a traditional function of government and not beyond
66
the reach of constitutional restrictions.
Finally, the Court addressed whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority
and concluded that this factor also indicated that Leesville acted as a
state actor. 67 The injury caused by racial discrimination is made
more severe because it occurs in the courtroom itself.68 This dis-

crimination brings into question the fairness of processes fundamental to the Constitution. 69 The Court also emphasized that the
Supreme Court has consistently stated that discrimination in the
qualifications or selection of jurors offends the integrity of the
courts.

70

The Court concluded from this analysis that the private peremptory challenge fulfills both of the Lugar requirements, and
therefore constitutional restrictions apply to this deprivation ofjury
service. 71 Because exclusion from a jury for racial reasons violates
the potential juror's equal protection rights, a racially motivated
peremptory challenge constitutes an infringement of these equal
64 The Court compared its holding in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). Edmondson, 111 S. Ct. at 2085. The Court in Terry found sufficient state action where a private
organization administered whites-only elections to select Democratic candidates to run
in primary elections in Ford Bend County, Texas. Edmondson, Il1 S. Ct. at 2085 (citing
Terry, 345 U.S. at 481).
65 Edmondson at 2086. The Court continued,
Were it not for peremptory challenges, there would be no question that the entire
process of determining who will serve on the jury constitutes state action. The fact
that the government delegates some portion of this power to private litigants does
not change the governmental character of the power exercised.
Id.
66 Id. Significantly, the Court distinguished Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312
(1981) where the Court held that a public defender is not a state actor in his general
representation of a criminal defendant. Edmondson, 111 S. Ct. at 2086 (citing Dodson, 454
U.S. at 325). The Court stated that this decision turned on the fact that the public defender had an adversarial relationship with the government, a condition not present in a
civil case involving two private litigants. Id. The Court instead relied on West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42 (1988) where the Court found that a private physician was a state actor after
contracting with the state to provide medical services to state prison inmates. Edmondson, 111 S. Ct. at 2086.
67 Id. at 2087.
68 Id.
69 Id. "Racial bias mars the integrity of the judicial system and prevents the idea of
democratic government from becoming a reality." Id.
70 Id. (citing Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991)).
71 Id.
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protection rights. 72
Next, the Court considered whether an opposing litigant may
73
raise on his own behalf the rights of the excluded potential juror.
Ordinarily, a litigant cannot rely on the rights of third parties to
74
make a claim for relief, but exceptions to this general rule exist.
The Court asserted that a litigant can raise a claim on behalf of a
third party if the litigant can demonstrate that he has suffered a concrete, redressable injury, that he has a close relationship to the third
party, and that serious obstacles would hamper the third party's effort to independently assert his rights. 7 5 The Court held that the
present case met all three of these factors, and therefore a private
76
litigant could raise the excluded juror's rights.
77
The Court quickly discharged the second and third factors.
While jurors have the right to sue after peremptory racial exclusions, the barriers to such suits, as in criminal trials, are severe. 78 In
addition, through voir dire the litigant and jurors develop a close
79
relationship which continues throughout the trial.
As for the remaining factor of the existence of an injury to the
litigant, the Court found that the litigant had suffered a cognizable
injury after a racial peremptory exclusion." Civil juries, like criminal juries, must act lawfully and impartially, and their decisions are
binding on the courts. 8 ' Racial discrimination in the selection of
jurors in both criminal and civil trials jeopardizes the fairness of the
judicial process.8 2 The Court concluded that to avoid fundamental
unfairness, racial discrimination must be expelled from the
courtroom.

83

In conclusion, since equal protection restrictions applied to
72
73
74
75

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370 (1991)).
Id. (citing Powers).

76 Id. The Court reasoned, "All three of these requirements for third-party standing
were held satisfied in the criminal context, and they are satisfied in the civil context as
well." Id. (citing Powers).

Id. at 2087-88.
Id. at 2087.
Id. at 2088. The Court continued, "exclusion of ajuror on the basis of race severs
that relation in an invidious way." Id.
80 Id.
77
78
79

81 Id.

Id.
Id. The Court added that means other than a race-based peremptory challenge
exist for litigants to satisfy themselves of the jury's impartiality. The Court stated that if
a litigant believes that a member of a certain race cannot be impartial, "the issue can be
explored in a rational way that consists with respect for the dignity of persons, without
the use of classifications based on ancestry or skin color." Id.
82
83
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Leesville's peremptory challenge and Edmonson could claim the
rights of the excluded jury, the Court reversed the decision of the
Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings to
determine whether a prima facie case of racial discrimination had
84
been established.
B.

THE DISSENTING OPINIONS

1. Justice O'Connor'sDissent
Justice O'Connor dissented, arguing that a peremptory challenge in a civil case does not constitute state action. 8 5 Justice
O'Connor asserted that while the government creates the trial structure and process, the government is not responsible for everything
that occurs within trial proceedings. 8 6 A peremptory strike of a ju87
ror by a private litigant is a matter of private choice.
In deciding whether Leesville's use of a peremptory challenge is
fairly attributed to the government, Justice O'Connor stated that the
complicated state action doctrine closely relates to the facts of each
case. 8 8 She stated that the basis of the state action test is that constitutional restrictions apply when the government is responsible for
the specific conduct involved.8 9 Justice O'Connor noted that the
majority addressed this requirement by stating that private parties
use peremptory challenges with the overt, significant participation
of the government, and that the use of peremptory challenges is a
traditional function of government. 90 According to Justice
O'Connor, both of these assertions are incorrect. 9 1
Justice O'Connor challenged the Court's evidence of government participation in the peremptory process. 92 Justice O'Connor
84 Id

at 2089.

85 Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting). Justice O'Connor was joined by ChiefJustice Rehn-

quist and Justice Scalia.
86 Id (O'Connor, J. dissenting). "The government erects the platform; it does not
thereby become responsible for all that occurs upon it." Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
87 Id. (O'ConnorJ. dissenting). Justice O'Connor further explained that by allowing
litigants to strike jurors for any reason, the peremptory challenge supports the perception and reality of an impartialjury. Id. at 2090 (O'Connor,J. dissenting). The peremptory challenge provides a means by which private parties can make choices to accomplish
the goal of an impartial jury. Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting). "In both criminal and civil
trials, the peremptory challenge is a mechanism for the exercise of private choice in the
pursuit of fairness." Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
88 Id. at 2089 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
89 ad (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
90 Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting). Justice O'Connor did not proceed through the
Lugar test; she makes no mention of such a test. Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
91 Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
92 Id. at 2090. (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
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stated that practices noted by the Court such as the establishment of
jury qualifications are independent from the use of peremptory challenges. 9 3 According to Justice O'Connor, the only participation of
the government in the peremptory challenge process occurs when
the judge advises the juror that he or she has been excused.
Through this action, the government does not compel, encourage,
or approve peremptory challenges. 94 Justice O'Connor also asserted that actions of a private attorney in a courtroom do not constitute state action simply because of the location of the trial. 95
Although racism is an abhorrent condition, the government cannot
be held responsible for every action within a courtroom. 96 Therefore, contrary to the Court's assertion, the government does not significantly or overtly participate in the peremptory challenge
process. 97 .
Justice O'Connor also argued that contrary to the Court's conclusion, the exercise of a peremptory challenge is not a traditional
government function. 98 Peremptory challenges are not part of the
government's jury selection process. 99 As jurors struck in peremptory
challenges otherwise satisfy the requirements for jury service, the
private litigant, not the government, rejects the jurors.10 0 Justice
O'Connor noted the long history of private peremptory challenges
and reasoned that this action is "traditionally" a private litigant's
93 Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting). Justice O'Connor continued, "All of this government action is in furtherance of the Government's distinct obligation to provide a quali-

fied jury; the Government would do these things even if there were no peremptory
challenges." Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
94 Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated that "the judge does little
more than acquiesce.., by excusing the juror." She also noted that in some jurisdictions peremptory challenges take place in the absence of any court personnel. Id.
(O'Connor, J. dissenting).
95 Id. at 2091 (O'Connor, J. dissenting). Justice O'Connor reasoned that Dodson obviously illustrates that the mere location in a courtroom does not constitute, by itself,
state action. Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
96 Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
97 Id. at 2092. (O'Connor, J. dissenting). Justice O'Connor analogized this state action question to the one presented in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974). InJackson, the Court ruled that a private utility company's termination of electrical service pursuant to a procedure approved by the state utility commission did not
constitute state action. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358. Justice O'Connor stated that the utility
commission's approval role was similar to a trial judge's approval of peremptory challenge in that neither government party encouraged the private action. Edmondson, Ill S.
Ct. at 2092. (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
98 Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
99 Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
100 Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting). "Whatever reason a private litigant may have for
using a peremptory challenge, it is not the government's reason." Id. (O'Connor, J.
dissenting).
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function. 0 1
Justice O'Connor also explained that the Court's opinion in
Polk County v. Dodson' 0 2 controls this case.10 3 In Dodson, the Court
held that a public defender, employed by the state, does not act
under color of state law when representing a defendant in a criminal
trial. 10 4 Following this opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that when
performing the adversarial functions of a trial, a private attorney
acts in the interests of the private litigant, independent of the government. 10 5 Justice O'Connor found no reason to distinguish a
public defender in a criminal trial from a private attorney in a civil
06
case against another private attorney.
Justice O'Connor then concluded that the government is not
07
responsible for the use of peremptory strikes by private litigants.'
Private peremptory challenges, therefore, are not subject to the restrictions of the Equal Protection Clause. 108
2. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia added a separate dissent discussing the potential
costs of the Court's decision.' 0 9 He stated that minority litigants,
especially in criminal cases, would no longer be able to seek to prevent an all-white jury. 1 0 For this reason, although proving racebased peremptory challenges of white jurors would be difficult, Justice Scalia asserted that in criminal cases this decision will result in a
net loss to minority litigants."'I In civil cases, Justice Scalia added,
this decision will not harm minority litigants so seriously, but it
' 12
"does not represent an unqualified gain either." "
Justice Scalia also expressed his concerns about the drain on
court resources that would result from enforcement of this deci101 Id. at 2093. (O'Connor, J. dissenting). "Peremptory challenges are not a traditional government function; the "tradition" is one of unguided private choice." Id.
(O'Connor, J. dissenting).
102 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
103 Edmondson, 111 S . Ct. at 2094. (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
104 Dodson, 454 U.S. at 325.
105 Edmondson, 111 S. Ct. at 2094. (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
106 Id. O'Connor reasoned one should not assume that because attorneys in an adversarial relationship with the state are not state actors, attorneys who are not in such a
relation are state actors. Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
107 Id. at 2095 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
108 Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
109 Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
110 Id. (Scalia,J. dissenting). Justice Scalia assumed that this decision logically applies
to criminal defendant's peremptory challenges. Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
111 Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
112 Id. (ScaliaJ. dissenting).
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sion.113 Justice Scalia reasoned that giving attorneys on both sides
of civil cases the right to object to peremptory challenges and appeal denial of such objections will significantly add to the courts'
burdensome administrative duties." 4 Justice Scalia asserted that
the high number of Batson claims made in recent years indicates that
judges and lawyers will spend an "enormous" amount of time implementing this decision.' 5
V.
A.

ANALYSIS

THE COURT CORRECTLY SELECTED THE LUGAR TEST TO
DETERMINE STATE ACTION

Edmonson forced the Court to determine whether state action
exists in a peremptory challenge exercised by a private litigant in a
civil trial. This situation called for the Court to select a state action
test from the several tests previously used by the Court and lower
federal courts. The Court correctly selected the two-part state action test established in Lugar.
The watershed Batson decision, for the first time, seriously exposed a prosecutor's peremptory challenges to the limits of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. That decision granted
defendants the right to ask for a race-neutral explanation for a prosecutor's peremptory challenge after the defendant presented a
prima facie case of racial discrimination. 1 6 The Court justified the
Batson decision by stating that a peremptory challenge with a purely
racial motivation violates the defendant's equal protection rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.' 17
Constitutional protections, including the Equal Protection
Clause, reach only the realm of state action and do not restrict the
actions of private parties, no matter how invidious. 188 "Embedded
in our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is a dichotomy between state action... and private conduct, against which the [Fourteenth] Amendment affords no shield, no matter how unfair the
conduct may be." 119 Clearly, a prosecutor using peremptory chalId. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
114 Id. at 2096 (Scalia, J. dissenting). "Thus, yet another complexity is added to an
increasingly Byzantine system ofjustice that devotes more and more of its energies to
sideshows and less and less to the merits of the case." Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
115 Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting). Justice Scalia mentioned the possibility that Congress or
the states may abolish peremptory challenges altogether. He stated that such a result
would cause justice to suffer in a "different fashion." Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
116 Batson, 479 U.S. at 93.
''3

117 Id.

at 98.

118 Edmondson, 111 S. Ct. at 2082.
119 National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988)
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lenges involves state action, as the prosecutor is acting on behalf of
the government. Batson, therefore, did not directly or explicitly address the state action issue.
In a civil trial, it is not clear whether state action is present in
the use of peremptory challenges. The litigants are private parties
utilizing private counsel resolving disputes between private parties.
Indeed, before Edmonson the Supreme Court had not extended Batson to civil trials.1 20 The Court correctly identified that the central
issue involved in whether to extend Batson to civil trials is whether
peremptory challenges in a civil trial involve sufficient state action to
subject these challenges to the restrictions of the Equal Protection
21
Clause.
Prior to Edmonson, two federal circuits had extended the Batson
ruling to civil trials. 12 2 Neither of these rulings, however, presented
a persuasive rationale to resolve the issue faced in Edmonson. Reynolds v. City of Little Rock involved a Section 1983 action against the
City of Little Rock by the administrator of a private individual's estate.1 23 The attorney representing the City used two of his peremptory challenges to exclude black individuals from the jury. 124 In
deciding the plaintiff's claim that these challenges violated the
Equal Protection Clause, the court held that Batson applies to government actors, regardless of whether the context is a civil or criminal trial.' 2 5 The City obviously constituted a government actor;
therefore Batson and the Equal Protection Clause applied to the
26
City's peremptory challenges.1
In Fludd v. Dykes, the plaintiff brought a Section 1983 action
1 27
against the deputy and sheriff of Richmond County, Georgia.
The defendant's attorney used two of his peremptory challenges to
remove the only two black individuals on the venire.1 2 s The plaintiff
(refusing to find state action in the involvement of the National Collegiate Athletic Association in the suspension of head basketball coach Jerry Tarkanian by the University of
Nevada-Las Vegas).
120 Jere W. Morehead, ProhibitingRace-based Peremptory Challenges: Should the Principleof
Equal Protection Be Extended to Private Litigants?, 65 TUL. U. L. REv. 833, 834 (1991).
121 Since Edmondson originated in federal court, the Court applied the Equal Protection part of the Fifth Amendment due process clause. Edmondson, 111 S. Ct. at 2080.
122 Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822 (11 th Cir. 1989); Reynolds v. City of Little Rock, 893
F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1990).
123 Reynolds, 893 F.2d at 1005.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 1008. The city claimed that Batson did not apply in the civil trial because
that decision was concerned with Sixth Amendment protections for criminal defendants,
not Seventh Amendment provisions for civil juries. Id.
126 Id. at 1009.
127 Fludd, 863 F.2d at 824.
128 Id.
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objected to these challenges on equal protection grounds and asked
the trial court to require a race-neutral explanation for the challenges. 129 The federal District Court overruled the plaintiff's objec30
tion, holding that Batson did not apply to civil proceedings.'
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court and applied the Batson decision to the Section 1983 action.13 1 The Fludd court reasoned that the trial judge's decision to
overrule the plaintiff's objection to the defendant's peremptory
challenges and proceed to trial denied the rights of the objecting
party. 13 2 The trial judge, a state actor, ignored the plaintiff's contention that the jury was selected in a racially discriminatory manner
and therefore engaged in activity violative of the Equal Protection
Clause. 133
The Fludd reasoning has been criticized as not providing a
boundary for the presence of state action.134 If a trial judge's decision to proceed to trial is the only state action necessary for extending the reach of constitutional restrictions, state action may be
found in a wide range of private actions with minimal government
involvement.13 5 A fundamentally important implication of this approach could be to seriously constrain the activities of a criminal
defense attorney, contrary to the well-established freedom criminal
36
defense attorneys now enjoy.'
The Court in Edmonson could not follow the logic of Reynolds
because the government is not a party in this case. Additionally,
without an explicit rejection, the Court correctly ignored the Fludd
reasoning. Instead, the Court correctly applied the self-limiting
state action test established in Lugar, which does not bring about the
potentially dangerous side effects of Fludd.
The Lugar state action test was formulated by the Court in the
context of a charge that a private party had acted jointly with the
state in depriving the plaintiff of his property without due process of
law. 137 In Lugar, an oil supplier sought prejudgment attachment of
129

130
131
132
133

Id.
Id.
Id. at 823.
Id. at 828.
Id. Although the sheriff and deputy were government actors, the Eleventh Circuit

did not use this situation as justification to extend Batson.
134 See Note, Eleventh Circuit Restricts the Discriminatoy, Use of Peremptory Challenges in Civil

Litigation, 103 HARV. L. REv. 586, 589 (1989).
135 Id. "If mere judicial toleration of a discriminatory private decision constitutes
state action, as Fludd suggests, courts could encounter difficulties in limiting state culpability in other situations involving substantially less government participation." Id.
136 Id. at 590.
137 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982).
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the plaintiff's property pursuant to state law after suing in state
court on a debt owed by the plaintiff.' 38 The plaintiff objected to
this attachment on due process grounds. 139
The Court stated that to sustain a constitutional claim, the
"conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [must]
be fairly attributable to the state."1 4 0 Drawing on precedent, the
Court annunciated a two-part test to determine the question of fair
attribution. 14 1 First, the alleged unconstitutional deprivation
must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by
the state or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person
for whom the state is responsible ....
Second, the party charged with
must
be
a
person
who
may fairly be said to be a state
the deprivation
42
actor. 1
Although the Court did not discuss alternatives to the Lugar
test in Edmonson, the Court in deciding other state action questions
has applied different tests, resulting in a very murky state action
doctrine. 14 3 Before looking at whether the Court was correct in deciding that a peremptory challenge fulfills the Lugar test, one must
ask then whether this is an appropriate test to apply. Although the
Court has often drawn a line between private and state action to
resolve constitutional claims, Lugar is the first case where the Court
44
explicitly set forth the two-part state action test.'
Two other prominent state action tests were available to the
Court in Edmonson. The Court established an early test in Burton v.
Wilmington ParkingAuthority.145 In Burton, a restaurant located within
an off-street parking building owned and operated by an agency of
the state discriminated against black individuals. 146 The restaurant
owners leased the space from the state agency. 147 In deciding
138

Id.

139
140

Id. at 925.
Id. at 937.

141 Id. See Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (state action found

in a private creditor utilizing state-created garnishment procedures); Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (state action found in private creditor's execution of a
vendor's lien to secure disputed property); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (Section 1983 action allowed against a private creditor exercising prejudgment replevin).
142 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. Although these principles are related, they are not always
identical. The Lugar Court stated that the two principles merge together when a constitutional deprivation is charged to a party with a clear official character. The principles
are separate, however, when the charged actor is a private party. Id.
143 Hala Ayoub, The State Action Doctrine in Stale and Federal Courts, I I FLA. ST. L. REv.
893, 894. (1984).
144 Id. at 908.
145 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
146

Id. at 716.

147 Id.
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whether sufficient state action was present to sustain an Equal Protection Clause claim, the Court noted that both the restaurant owners and the state derived benefits from their relationship. 148 The
Court concluded that this symbiotic relationship brought the actions
of the restaurant under the scope of the restrictions of the Four49
teenth Amendment. 1

This interdependent relationship thus became the test to use in
determining the existence of state action. Clearly, the presence of
such an interdependent relationship warrants a finding of state action in many activities of a private party. This test, however, confines a state action finding to a particular set of circumstances.
Although since Burton courts have tried to manipulate this symbiotic
relationship test to apply to different kinds of relationships, more
recently this test has been limited in its application to lessor/lessee
relationships.150 Such a test would not be useful in the case of peremptory challenges because the relationship between a state judge
and a private litigant is fundamentally different from a lessee and
lessor relationship.
Later, in Jackson v. MetropolitanEdison Co., the Court stated that
there must exist "a sufficiently close nexus" between the state and
the challenged action of the private individual or entity for the challenged action to be fairly treated as that of the state itself.' 5' The
Court further developed this "nexus" test in Blum v. Yaretsky. 152 In
Blum, a private nursing home discharged or transferred patients who
no longer needed the level of care provided by the nursing home,
effectively reducing or terminating the patients' Medicaid coverage. 15 3 In deciding that insufficient state action was present, the
Court forwarded three principles necessary to constitute state action.' 54 First, a sufficiently close nexus must be found between the
148
149

Id. at 724.
Id.

150 Ayoub, supra note 143, at 902 (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982)).

In Rendell-Baker, the Court declined to find state action in a private non-profit school
discharging personnel. The Court distinguished the case from Burton, explaining that
the school was a contractor who was employed by the government, not a lessee of the
government. Id. at 842.
151 419 U.S. 345 (1974). In Jackson, a privately owned and operated utility regulated
by the state terminated the account of a customer. Id. at 347. The plaintiff charged that
this termination constituted a due process violation. Id. The Court held that the state's
regulatory activities did not constitute sufficient state action to sustain a due process
claim. Id. at 358.
152 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
153 Id. at 995.
154 Id. at 1004.
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state and challenged action.1 5 5 Second, for state action to exist, the
state must exercise coercive power over or provide significant encouragement to the private actor.156 Third, the required nexus may
be present when a private entity has exercised powers that are tradi15 7
tionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.
The Lugar test is more appropriate than the "nexus" test to apply to peremptory challenges. The type of private action involved in
peremptory challenges is similar to the private action in Lugar. In
Lugar, the prejudgment attachment procedure required that Edmonson allege a belief that Lugar was disposing of or might dispose
of his property to satisfy his creditors.' 58 After this petition was
filed, the county sheriff executed a writ of attachment.' 5 9 This procedure is similar to the process of a peremptory challenge, where
the private litigant exercises the challenge, and the trial judge is the
party who actually dismisses the stricken juror. In addition, like the
peremptory challenge, the attachment procedure is a procedure es60
tablished by statute.1
The private action in Blum, on the other hand, involved an action by a health care provider in an area regulated by the state.' 6 1
The state in Blum did not assist in executing a certain procedure, but
instead acted in response to a private action as part of a regulatory
scheme governing the allocation of health benefits.' 6 2 A peremptory
challenge in a civil trial has little in common with Medicaid regulations governing benefit allocation for nursing home care. Thus, because Lugar involves a more analogous fact situation than Blum, the
Court in Edmonson correctly applied the Lugar test to determine
1 63
whether a peremptory challenge constitutes state action.
155 Id. (citingJackson v. MetropolitanEdison Co. at 351).

156 Id.
157 Id. at 1005 (citingJackson, 419 U.S. at 353). The Court in Blum held that a reduction of Medicaid benefits as a result of the discharge of patients did not constitute state

action under this test. Id. The Court reasoned that the Medicaid benefit reductions
were only responses to decisions of private physicians and administrators to discharge
patients. Id.
158 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982).
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Blum, 457 U.S. at 994.
162 Id.

163 Nevertheless, the selection of one test over the other may not be crucial to the

analysis. The Lugar test appears to incorporate at least some of the factors present in
Blum. In considering whether a right or privilege is created by a state, a court would

inevitably consider whether the state sanctioned or encouraged the action in question.
Similarly, in determining the status of a private party as a state actor, the court would
discuss whether the activity is traditionally reserved to the state and whether state officials have significantly aided the private actor.
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THE COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE LUGAR TEST
RESULTS IN A FINDING OF STATE ACTION

The Court applied the Lugar test and held that Leesville's peremptory challenges constituted sufficient state action to warrant the
application of Equal Protection Clause restrictions. The Court correctly found that a private litigant's peremptory challenge has its
source in state action. In addition, although the Court incorrectly
asserted that the peremptory challenge is a traditional state function, the involvement of the state in the exercise of a peremptory
challenge and the harm of racial discrimination in this process indicate that Leesville sufficiently resembled a state actor.
The Court quickly disposed of the first Lugar requirement, that
the action depriving rights must be caused by the exercise of some
right created by the state.1 64 An examination of historical and current sources of peremptory challenges illustrates that the right to
exercise peremptory challenges does indeed have its source in state
authority.
The Constitution does not create a right of peremptory challenges; the only source of these challenges is statutory. 16 5 As early
as 1790, Congress established the right to peremptory challenges. 16 6 At that time, a defendant was entitled to 35 peremptories
in trials for treason and twenty peremptories in trials for other felonies punishable by death. 16 7 States followed the lead of the federal
government and enacted statutes granting litigants the right to peremptory challenges.' 6 8 The peremptory challenges utilized by
Leesville in Edmonson were pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1870 which states
in part: "In civil cases, each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges."' 1 69 Without this statutory authorization, the litigants in Edmonson would not have been able to exercise peremptory
challenges.170 Clearly the exercise of a peremptory challenge has its
source in federal statute and fulfills the first prong of the Lugar state
action test.
The second prong of the Lugar test is more troublesome than
the first. The Court in Edmonson analyzed three different considera164 Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (1991).
165 Id.
166 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 214 (1965).
167 Id. (citing I Stat. 119 (1790)).
168 Id. at 215. "In every state, except where peremptory strikes are a substitute, peremptory challenges are given by statute to both sides in both criminal and civil cases, the
number in criminal cases still being considerably greater." Id. at 217.
169 28 U.S.C. 1870 (1988).
170 Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., I11 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (1991).
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tions to determine whether a private attorney exercising a peremptory challenge in a civil trial acts as a state actor.1 71 These factors
include (1) the extent to which the actor relies on governmental
assistance and benefits; (2) whether the actor is performing a traditional government function; and (3) whether the injury caused is
furthered by the invoking of government authority. 172 While reaching the correct result on this second Lugar requirement, the Court
incorrectly concluded that a peremptory challenge is a traditional
government function. However, in exercising peremptory challenges, Leesville relied on governmental assistance, and the injury
caused by a racially discriminatory peremptory challenge is furthered by the government's involvement. These two conclusions
justify the Court's holding that Leesville acted as a state actor.
In looking at the extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits, the Court discussed the many steps involved in the jury selection process.1 7 3 Certainly, without the
governmental establishment of the elements of the jury selection
process, the private litigants would have no jury from which to exercise peremptory challenges. However, as the dissent noted, this jury
selection activity is simply a prerequisite to the exercise of peremptory challenges.' 7 4 A finding that in making a peremptory challenge
a private litigant relies on the assistance of the government must
rest not on the fact that the government is responsible for the existence of the jury, but instead should rely on governmental involve1 75
ment in the peremptory challenge process.
When a lawyer exercises a peremptory challenge, the trial judge
actually excuses the juror. 17 6 The trial judge also may decide which
side exercises the last challenge, may require a simultaneous exercise of challenges, and may require that one party exercise his challenges first.' 7 7 Justice O'Connor's dissent dismissed this judicial
involvement as insignificant participation of the government and in
doing so ignored the fact that without this participation of the trial
judge, peremptory challenges would be worthless. 178 Since the trial
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.

at 2084. Among the steps mentioned are: the establishment of jury credentials, adoption of a plan for locating and summoningjurors, defining thejury wheel, and
procedures for assignment to grand and petit juries. Id.
174 Id. at 2090 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
175 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
176 Id. at 2084.
177 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 233 (5th Cir. 1990) (Rubin
dissenting).
178 Edmonson, Ill S. Ct. at 2085.

1020

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[Vol. 82

judge presides over jury selection and ultimately excludes jurors, a
peremptory challenge without the cooperation of the trial judge
would result in the challenged juror remaining in the venire.17 9 The
action of a judge in facilitating a peremptory challenge is therefore
not a simple ministerial function; it is actually an overt act by a governmental actor to put the weight of the government behind a private action. 18 0
This significant assistance of the state in a peremptory challenge is similar in degree to the state assistance found in Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope. 18 1 In Tulsa, the state court's
involvement in probate proceedings, particularly the activation of a
time bar on claims against an estate, was considered sufficiently substantial involvement for a finding of state action in depriving a creditor of due process. 18 2 Without court activation of the time bar, the
denial of the claims of the creditor could not have occurred. 8 3 Similarly, in Edmonson, if the trial judge had not excused thejurors, the
peremptory challenges would not have removed the black individu184
als from the jury.
Justice O'Connor incorrectly relied on Jackson to show that the
assistance of the government in peremptory challenges does not rise
to the state action level.' 8 5 In Jackson, a utility customer claimed that
a service cutoff violated his due process rights under Section
1983.186 In denying that the involvement of the state utility commission constituted state action, the Court noted that the only connection of the commission with the cutoff policy was the utility
company's notice filing with the state commission and the lack of
any commission action to prohibit the policy.1 8 7 This assistance of
the state utility commission is considerably less significant than the
assistance given by the trial judge to peremptory challenges. The
utility commission did not explicitly facilitate the cutoff policy or the
service cutoff; the commission only failed to object to the general
policy as part of its oversight responsibilities.18 8
179 Id.

180 Id.
181 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
182 Id. at 491.
183

Id. at 487.

184 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2085.
185 Id. at 2091 (O'Connor, J. dissenting). "Jackson is a more appropriate analogy to

this case .... The termination was not state action because the state had done nothing
to encourage the particular termination practice." Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
186 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 347 (1974).
187 Id. at 357.
188 Id.
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The second factor used by the Court to conclude Leesville resembled a state actor is that a peremptory challenge is traditionally a
state function.'8 9 This result is at the least suspect. While peremptory challenges are part of a largerjury selection process established
by the government, it is not clear when one looks narrowly at a peremptory challenge .whether this action is a traditional government
function.
As the dissent noted, private parties have had the right to use
peremptory challenges in civil trials for over one hundred years. 190
This right was conferred on opposing litigants in an effort to use the
adversarial process to ensure an impartial jury in a civil trial. 19 1 A
private litigant uses a peremptory challenge for his own reasons and
not for reasons forwarded by the state.' 9 2 It would seem, then, that
the challenge itself is traditionally a private function, and not an action traditionally reserved for the state.
The majority improperly relied on West v. Atkins 19 in this context. In West, the state contracted with a private physician to provide
health care services to prison inmates. 19 4 The Court stated in West
that the state had a constitutional obligation under the Eighth
Amendment to provide adequate health care to inmates in state correctional facilities. 19 5 The Court found that because the private
physician was acting as an employee of the state in fulfilling legal
196
obligations of the state, the private physician was a state actor.
Unlike the provision of health care to state prison inmates, in
exercising a peremptory challenge, a private litigant does not undertake an action to fulfill a legal obligation of the state. While federal law authorizes the use of peremptory challenges, the private
litigant is not obligated to use these challenges in the same way that a
private physician employed by the state is required to provide adequate health care to inmates. In West, if the physician did not provide the health care services, the state failed to meet its legal
obligations.' 9 7 However, a private attorney's failure to use a peremptory challenge will not subject the state to any legal action.
Terry v. Adams 19 8 is slightly more useful in establishing that perEdmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2085.
190 Id. at 2092 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
191 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218 (1965).
192 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2092 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
193 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
194 Id. at 44.
189

195 Id. at 56.
196 Id.

197 Id. at 56.
198 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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emptory challenges could be considered a traditional function of
government. 19 9 Like in the Democratic primary elections in Terry,
the private action of peremptory challenges is part of a larger government function. However, the relationship of the challenged action and the electoral process in Terry differs from the relationship
of peremptory challenges and the overall jury selection process.
Unlike the peremptory challenge process, the selection of candidates for office is not traditionally a private part of a larger government function. Conducting elections is in every way a traditional
government function.
The Court correctly reasoned that its third state actor factor is
20 0
fulfilled by a private litigant using a peremptory challenge.
Clearly, "the injury caused by the discrimination is made more severe because the government permits it to occur within the courthouse itself". 20 1 Racial discrimination in the exclusion of jurors
harms the parties to the case, the excluded jurors and the commu20 2
nity at large.
The Court in Batson noted that discrimination in jury selection
violates the rights of defendants to be afforded the protections inherent in trial by jury. 20 3 This harm equally applies to civil and
criminal litigants. A black litigant in a civil trial has the same right to
ajury selected in a non-discriminatory fashion as a black defendant
in a criminal trial. Like criminal trials, civil trials involve interests
vital to the litigants. 20 4 In a civil trial a jury can deny a litigant
needed relief for a deprivation of health or property and can deny
compensation for a constitutional violation. 20 5 These significant interests warrant protection from the dangers of a jury selected in a
racially discriminatory fashion.
Discriminatory peremptory challenges also harm the jurors involved. 20 6 Denying participation in our nation's court system solely
because of race suggests that the class affected is inherently unable
199 The Court in Terry found state action in a scheme in which a private organization,
theJaybird Democratic Association, conducted elections in which only white individuals

voted to select candidates to run in Democratic party primaries in Ford Bend County,
Texas. Id. at 1154. In Texas at that time, the Democratic candidates were virtually assured victory. Id.
200 Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (1991).
201 Id.

Amici Curiae Brief of American Civil Liberties Union at 4, Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., I1l S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (No. 89-7743) [hereinafter ACLU Brief].
203 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986).
204 ACLU Brief, supra note 202, at 5.
205 Id. at 6.
202

206 Id.
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to fulfill a basic obligation of citizenship. 20 7 This denial stigmatizes
not only the excluded jurors, but also other members of the racial
group. 20 8 This racial exclusion harms jurors in both criminal and
civil trials.
Finally, racially-biased jury selection procedures harm the public at large. 20 9 A properly functioning judicial system requires public confidence in the impartiality of the courts. 2 10 A jury selection
process containing mechanisms used in a racially discriminatory
manner undermines this public confidence, whether in a criminal or
21
civil setting. '
State action advances all of these harms in peremptory jury
challenges. The trial judge is the actor that actually excuses the excluded juror after a peremptory challenge. The peremptory challenge takes place within the state or federally operated court system.
The court system symbolizes the authority of the federal government and state and local governments. The fact that the racial discrimination occurs within this context creates the harm to the
community and significantly worsens the harm to the jurors and the
litigants. 21 2
In looking at the state actor question, then, a peremptory challenge in a civil trial is undertaken with the significant and overt
assistance of the state - the trial judge facilitates the challenge by
excusing the stricken juror. In so doing, the trial judge places the
weight of the court behind the peremptory challenge. This action of
the trial judge, along with the general context of the governmental
court system, also facilitates the harmful effects of a racially discriminatory peremptory challenge. These harmful effects are felt by the
private litigant, the excluded jurors, and the public at large.
The Court failed to prove that a peremptory challenge constitutes a traditional government function. More accurately, the peremptory challenge is a traditionally private process within an overall
governmental jury selection process. This point alone, however,
does not jeopardize the Court's state action finding. The governmental assistance represented by the trial judge and the harm
caused by invoking this assistance renders Leesville a state actor,
subject to constitutional restrictions.
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
ACLU Brief, supra note 202, at 7.
209 Id. at 8.
210 Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (1991).
211 Id.
212 Id.
207
208
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JUSTICE SCALIA OVERSTATED THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE EFFECTS

OF THIS DECISION

In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia made two warnings about
the implications of Edmonson.21 3 First, Scalia warned of the effect on
criminal defense of an extension of Batson to criminal defense counsel's peremptory challenges. 2 14 Batson did not require criminal defense counsel to offer race neutral explanations for peremptory
challenges, and the Court in Edmonson made no reference to this
issue. Justice Scalia asserted that the civil trial extension of Batson
logically applies to criminal defense counsel, and that this application would have a chilling effect on the ability of minority criminal
2 15
defendants to create racially favorable juries.
However, there are obstacles to this extension to criminal defendants. Applying Batson to criminal defendants would present
constitutional questions not present in extending this holding to
civil trials. 21 6 This application to criminal defendants may violate
the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent or the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective counsel. 2 17 Applying Batson to criminal
defense counsel also raises policy questions not present when considering the civil trial extension, such as the significant differences in
roles and resources between prosecutors and criminal defendants. 21 8 The disproportionate resources generally available to the
state in criminal trials would give the state an advantage in offering
proof of discriminatory intent in the exercise of peremptory challenges. 21 9 In addition, because a criminal defendant faces imprisonment and sometimes death if convicted, perhaps a criminal
defendant should retain the right to use peremptory challenges
2 20
without any restrictions.
A second problem with the extension of Batson to criminal de213 Id. at 2095 (Scalia,J. dissenting).
214 Id. (ScaliaJ. dissenting).
215 Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting). At the time of this writing, the Court has granted certiorari to determine this very issue. In State v. McCollum, 405 S.E.2d 688 (1991), three
white defendants in a criminal assault trial struck all the black jurors from the venire.
The Court agreed on November 4th, 1991 to consider whether Batson should be extended to this situation. Georgia v. McCollum (S. Ct.), No. 91-372, Nov. 4, 1991.
216 ACLU Brief, supra note 202, at 18.
217 Id. Regarding the Fifth Amendment, a proceeding to determine the purpose of a
peremptory challenge may require a defendant to present self-incriminating evidence.
As for the Sixth Amendment, depriving a defense attorney of the right to freely use
peremptory challenges may violate the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective
counsel.
218 Id.
219

Id.

220 Id.
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fendants arises when considering the rights involved in a prosecu2 21
tor's challenge to a criminal defendant's peremptory challenge.
A prosecutor's constitutional challenge to a defendant's peremptory
challenge would in part be an attempt to ensure that a trial is sufficiently fair to the state. Nothing in the Constitution, however, entitles the state to a fair trial.2 2 2 Constitutional protections generally

protect individuals from the government, not vice-versa. 223 Therefore, a prosecutor challenging the defendant's exercise of peremptories challenges on an equal protection basis may only involve
22 4
the rights of the stricken jurors, not the state as a litigant.
Third, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in a peremptory jury challenge under Batson, the defendant must show that
he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor
hag exercised peremptory challenges to remove jurors of the defendant's race.2 25 This requirement would seem to eliminate the
ability of a prosecutor to challenge a criminal defendant's peremptory challenge because the state is not a member of a cognizable
racial group.2 26 In Powers v. Ohio, however, the Court held that a
criminal defendant may object to a prosecutor's race-based exclusion ofjurors regardless of the defendant's race.2 2 7 The Court rea-

soned that Batson is not limited to cases where the excluded jurors
are of the same race as the defendant because the jurors' rights are
violated even if the defendant is of a different race. 22 8 Still, Batson

required the defendant to be of the same race as the excluded jurors
for a valid prima facie case of discrimination, and in remanding Edmonson, the Court instructed the lower court to use the same approach as Batson to determine the existence of a prima facie case of
discrimination. 22 9 A court applying Batson to criminal defendants
would have to address whether the race of the litigant remains
23 0
significant.
221 Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Juy: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges,
and the Review ofJury Verdicts, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 153, 197 (1989).
222 Id.
223
224

Id.
Id. Alschuler reasons that prosecutors should be able to assert the rights of ex-

cluded jurors. Id.
225 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
226 Alschuler supra note 221, at 198.
227 Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1373 (1991).
228
229

Id.

Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2088-89 (1991). "In Batson, we held that determining whether a prima facie case has been established requires
consideration of all relevant circumstances ..... The same approach applies in the civil
context." Id.
230 Alschuler lists several other limitations of Batson, besides the problems of applying
the holding to criminal defendants. Alschuler, supra note 221, at 200. For example,
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Justice Scalia also warned that by exposing peremptory challenges to constitutional restrictions, Edmonson will worsen the already crushing administrative burden on the courts. 23 1 The Court
in Batson disposed of this concern by saying that states already using
the Batson proof standard had not experienced any severe administrative problems. 2 32 In making this assertion, however, the Court
23 3
offered very limited proof.
Batson offered little guidance on the procedures lower courts
are to use after a defendant successfully presents a prima facie case
of discrimination in a peremptory jury challenge. One commentator
suggests there are four possibilities that a court may follow: (1) an
ex parte, in camera hearing in which the prosecutor offers a race
neutral reason without the defendant being present or having the
opportunity to rebut; (2) an open, non-adversarial hearing in which
the defendant is present, but may not offer a rebuttal; (3) an open,
adversarial hearing in which the defendant may rebut the prosecutor's explanation; or (4) a full evidentiary hearing in which the
prosecutor testifies to the reasons for his peremptories, and the defendant has the option of cross-examination. 2 34 Federal courts have
split on which option to use. 23 5 Some courts have allowed an ex
parte hearing while others have required a full adversarial hearing. 23 6 No federal court has yet used the fourth option, a full-scale
23 7
evidentiary hearing.
With such little guidance, it is not clear how trial judges will
enforce the Edmonson decision. Most likely will not employ a full
evidentiary hearing, so the most administratively costly option listed
Alschuler asserts that while prosecutors may not discriminate against blacks in peremptory challenges (after Batson), they may discriminate against women, homosexuals, handicapped individuals and different ethnic or religious groups. Id.
231 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2096 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
232 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986).
233 Id. The Court cites a California case, People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 672 P. 2d 854
(1983) in which the California Supreme Court found no evidence that implementation
of its version of this standard was burdensome for trial judges. In Hall, a black defendant accused of assault and false imprisonment challenged the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike black jurors. Id. at 855. The trial judge quickly accepted
the prosecutor's race neutral explanation that was required as part of a Batson-type procedure. Id. at 856. The court held that the trial judge did not make a sufficient effort to
evaluate the prosecutor's explanation in the context of the circumstances of the case. Id.
at 859. The Hall court refuted the prosecution's charge that the procedure was unworkable by stating that other states had implemented such a procedure and that the prosecution offered no empirical evidence to support its claim. Id.
234 Brett M. Kavanaugh, Defense Presence and Participation:A ProceduralMinimumfor Batson v. Kentucky Hearings. 99 YALE LJ. 187, 189 (1989).
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
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above is probably not an issue. Certainly, however, any of the other
three options involve varying degrees of administrative costs to the
court. These processes have added time and cost to the criminal
litigation process since Batson and will now begin to do so in civil
trials.
All constitutional guarantees involve administrative costs, however. 2 38 One may argue that the continued addition of constitutional guarantees and the costs imposed by these guarantees have
made the criminal trial system unnecessarily expensive and timeconsuming. 23 9 The goal of Edmonson, however, may be worth the
price. The Court has consistently stated that the very integrity of
the judicial system is at stake when looking at racial discrimination
injury selection. 240 Since discriminatory peremptory challenges call
the integrity of the court system into question, the utility of removing this discrimination is potentially enormous. 24 1 If it is true that
discrimination in peremptory jury challenges jeopardizes the integrity of the courts, the incremental administrative costs of adding Batson procedures to civil trials, whatever the costs may be, appear
small in comparison.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Edmonson continues the re-shaping of the right to exercise peremptory jury challenges which the Court started in Swain. The
Court correctly indicated that Batson must apply to private litigants
in civil trials if state action can be found in such a private peremptory challenge. However, perhaps in its eagerness to decry the racial discrimination alleged in Edmonson, the Court seemingly picked
a state action test out of the air and stated that the private peremptory challenge overwhelmingly fulfills this test.
Holes in the Court's reasoning do not, in the end, prevent the
Court from reaching the correct result on the state action question.
The test used is appropriate, and the statutory basis of the peremptory challenge, the involvement of the court in its exercise, and the
238 Id. at 203.
239 See Alschuler supra note 221, at 199. "If one wanted to understand how the
American trial for criminal cases came to be the most expensive and time-consuming in
the world, it would be difficult to find a better starting point than Batson." Id. (quoting
William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease But Killing the Patient, 1987 S. CT.

REv. 97, 155).

240 Brief for Petitioner at 14, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077
(1991) (No. 89-7743).
241 Interestingly, in a concurrence in Batson, Justice Marshall stated that the only way
to remove this discrimination was to totally eliminate peremptory challenges. Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103 (1986) (Marshall, J. concurring).
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consequences of discrimination together constitute the state action
necessary to warrant application of constitutional restrictions.
Justice Scalia's warnings are potential pitfalls of the Edmonson
decision; however, they are oversimplified and probably overstated.
As for the application of Batson to criminal defendants, the Court
will soon enough indicate whetherJustice Scalia is correct. The suggested administrative costs are uncertain in magnitude and must be
weighed against the severe consequences of racial discrimination
existing in the courts.
MARK L. JOSEPHS

